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The market for loyalties:
agenda-setting for a Global
Communications Commission

by Prof

Monroe E. Price, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva

University, New York, USA

T

HE EXTENSIVE REFORMS of the International
Telecommunication Union, the result of extraordinary efforts over
the last decade to redefine the future of international regulation,
have not reduced the call for even stronger global jurisdiction over the
booming growth and cascading transnational impact of telecoms and
media organisations. In this essay, I examine the underlying tensions that
make international agreement on a Global Communications Commission,
with tough law-making and regulatory authority, so hard to achieve.
My method is to project from the national experience to the transnational. I
argue that media law and regulation, in the national context, enacts what I
call a market for loyalties. Law serves to mediate among groups competing
to affect or control national identity. Only if there is consensus among the
major competitors in this market (which, as we shall see, is different from the
market for goods), does law come effectively into play. Media law and
regulation, with important, but irrelevant exceptions, exists, generally, for the
convenience of those whom it is designed to serve.
The market for loyalties works on the global level as well as the national.
What is true for the theory of development of a national or regional
regulatory system applies with at least equal weight at the more universal.
Without a consensus among those who compete in a global market for
loyalties, law cannot evolve. Bureaucratic or administrative solutions to a
problem that has so substantially divided the negotiating countries seem
highly unlikely. Perhaps existing bodies will accrete power or new entities
will be established. But the greater possibility is that in the absence of
something like "the state" more informal, flexible, less visible mechanisms
will continue to operate to shape the market.
Euphemisms-such as level playing field or the free market-are employed
to mask conflicts, Too much is at stake, at present, and there is too much
uncertainly for there to be agreement on the harsh political and economic
questions yet unresolved. Contests for geopolitical advantage, in terms of
economic shares and ideological shares as well, are too lively for the
participants to allow their resolution to be regulated and foreclosed. For
example, the "level playing field" aspiration hides the fact that it is not
sufficiently clear what the dimensions of the field should be, what constitutes
levelness, and in whose interest a level playing field (or other metaphor
disguising changed balances of power) must lie.

The rise of the nation-state
The experience in the nation-state is helpful in understanding the potential
for global regulation for yet another reason. The very rise of the nation-state
can be tied to its role in the regulation of the mass media. Scholars such as
INTER,\1EDIA OCTOBER·NOVEMBER 1994/VOLUME 221NO.5
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Benedict Anderson have written
about the role that the changing
dynamics of the press had on the
kind of community that was
imagined, and how nation-states
grew and gained or lost power from
such changed conceptions. A similar
transformation is occurring now, as
technology-satellites, electronic
highways, relentlessly global
telephony, have qualities that make
them seem unregulable, bursting
from existing political boundaries. 1
Just as the rise of the nation-state
was useful in bringing order to
competition among media within its
borders, a global communications
entity can be brought into being to
bring order to the transnational
competition existing today. But for
that to be the case, the first point
returns: there must either be the
coercive force that comes with
sovereignty or a consensus that
order-the cartelisation of
identities-is desired.
Delineating a market for loyalties,
then, can help us understand the
legal and political responses to the
gigantic, mysterious transformations
now taking place in media industries
as telecommunications becomes
more global, confounding national
borders and the reach of national
legislation. As political boundaries
crumble and new nations are
created, the central function of the
state in manufacturing identities
becomes more clear. I explore the
bond between the nature of the
media and the endurance of the state
to explain the potential bond
between the nature of technology
and the existence of a global
regulatory order.

A. Locating the Market
Let me turn, then, to the relationship
of media to regulation in the nationstate. It is somewhat easier to
describe a market for goods than a
market for loyalties. In a market for
automobiles or sugar, there are
usually identifiable buyers and
sellers; there is a market-clearing
price and a means for settling
accounts. To establish a market for
loyalties, it is difficult to locate exact
counterparts: the major "sellers" or
producers are the manufacturers of
identities, classically the
16
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government, but others as well such
as interest groups and businesses as
a class, those for whom myths and
dreams and history can be converted
into power and wealth. 2 The
"buyers" are citizens, subjects,
nationals, consumers-individuals
or their surrogates-receivers of the
packages of information,
propaganda, advertisements, drama
aqd news propounded by the media.
The consumer can, and does, "pay"
for one set of identities or another in
several ways which, together, we
call "loyalty" or "citizenship." But
the price is not in the ordinary coin
of the realm. More often, the charge
for loyalties includes the payment of
taxes, the obeying of laws, and the
readiness to fight in the armed
services. Indeed, merely staying
within the dominion of a state,
where migration is an option, can
constitute a form of payment for
loyalty.
One has to look at the producers or
supply side as well. The supply side
in the market for loyalties has a
structure which is disserved by
reductionist terms like "state" or
"government" or "political party."
Sometimes, citizens have little choice
in terms of national identity, with
only a single seller (or a small,
relatively undifferentiated group)
with which to deal. Were this
usually the case, there still might be
a market, but it would tend toward
the qualities of a totalitarian society
in which the cost of disloyalty is
high and in which the competition is
almost always outlawed. 3 On the
supply side of national identities, the
market for loyalties is enriched by
the potential instabilities of all
national identities, and the fact that
the choice among them is, at least at
a moment of some instability, more
varied and competitive than might
usually be the case. What we may
commonly mean by a modern
"transition society" is a post-socialist
entity where the formal market for
loyalties is no longer monopolistic,
though the transition could
ultimately be from one form of
monopoly or near-monopoly over
identities to another.
The economic model provides
insight into what the government
considers its most important

potential competition in its effort to
maintain power, since these
competitors are most likely to be
taxed or proscribed or otherWise
discriminated against. Here, the
question is what products constitute
substitutes" in the market for
loyalties. In that sense, the
preoccupation that European
governments long have had with
competition from commercial
broadcasters suggests that their
impact on allegiances was perceived
to constitute a substitute for more
traditional packages of identity.
Advertising persuades individuals
to consume rather than to save and
invest; in this and other ways, the
cumulative impact of advertising
has consequences for particular
visions of the public good.
Marketers of historic or traditional
or nation-based national identities
compete with sellers of consumer
goods, who are trying to impress the
citizen with an identity that ties
them to a world or global
community.
IJ

B. Media Structures and
Barriers to Entry
Enormous effort is expended by
governments everywhere to
articulate, shape, and reinforce
images considered vital to their
continuance, images that constitute
versions of national identity, what
Seton-Watson has called "official
nationalism," the conscious effort of
government to shape a set of
narratives that provide a cohesive
framework for ongoing state
legitimacy. The question is how
these efforts have been manifested in
the market for loyalties, how they
have been affected by changed
technology, and how they will be
limited, again, by the changes that
are forthcoming.
One of R. H. Coase's early economic
analyses of law showed how
regulation, in Britain, was used to
limit competition from radio signals
from France and Luxembourg. His
history of the early BBe suggested
how a medium, with transnational
potential, was seized by internal
interest groups, using law to exclude
external competition. With
important exceptions, often
propaganda-related, broadcasting

was turned into an essentially
nation-based enterprise for its first
half-century.
In the Western European states, this
phenomenon was captured by the
virtually universal practice of
limiting broadcasting competition
for national identities, until the mid1970s, primarily to entities
controlled by government or closely
related to it. If there was to be a
competition for loyalties, it would be
mediated through the government.
These were not oppressive states,
and they respected freedom of
information. But the monopoly over
the twentieth-century's most
powerful medium was a reflection of
strong state participation in the
market for loyalties; it was difficult
to surrender and often important to
the internal mediating, suppression
or working out of differences.
The Dutch System
I will focus on the Dutch radio and
television system long famous for its
intricate recognition of specific
separated perceptions of Dutch
national identities. I do so precisely
to show how important national
control of the medium was to the
working out of a market for
loyalties. Consistent with a political
philosophy that assumes "pillarised"
segments of society-Catholic,
Protestant, liberal and socialist-the
Dutch have established a television
system that, for a long time, gave
each segment its own
unencumbered opportunity to
broadcast, first on radio, then on
television. Competition was among
these groups for allocation of time
available, with awards dependent on
numbers of members they had.
Internal informal sanctions,
including taboos imposed by the
groups themselves, 4 rendered these
pillarised broadcasting organisations
powerful reinforcers of separate
visions of Dutch identity, to limit, as
it were, interbrand competition.
What is interesting is not only the
rules that determined what groups
could participate, but the effort to
exclude competitors that would pose
a challenge to all of them. These
included "pirates," spill-over
signals, and, finally, directed
programming from abroad using

satellite and cable.
national identities, TRT, as the
proponent of the modern secular
The existing favoured interest
state, was seen as an instrument for
groups, with government as the
cohesiveness. When the number of
organising entity, used domestic
law, multilateral agreements, resort
channels available was expanded in
to transnational regulatory bodiesthe 1980s to bring programme
whatever technique was possible, to
availability closer to world
retain national control over the mix
standards, the new channels, at the
and content of signals. The Dutch
time, were all made part of TRT.
situation remains complicated. In
When TRT was attacked for leaning
terms of the economic model,
to the left and broadcasting
however, the history of broadcasting -programs that legitimated Islamic
in the Netherlands is illuminating
fundamentalism-a doctrine
for many reasons. Here was a place
considered hostile to the secular
where the system was originally and
state-the agency's director genera]
explicitly designed to identify
was forced to resign. 8
Examples in which law is used to
alternative proponents of a national
identity and careful to allocate
protect particular national identities
markets among them. These
can be reproduced in Belgium,
Germany, in China, almost
competitors, as might well be
everywhere: in each case
expected, sought to exclude others
who might reduce their market
demonstrating how national
share. Competition from abroads
legislation is used in widespread
altered the capacity of the state to
fashion to allocate internal markets
preserve the strength of the existing
and to establish, where possible,
competitors or stabilise the ability of
cartels of allegiances.
those who continued to seek to
market loyalties to use the media to
C. New technology, globalism
reinforce particular identities. 6
and the market for loyalties
One can say that the European
The primary function of
Union serves as the next higher
international legal organisations,
institution for the organisation of the
until recently, has been to preserve
media at a time when, as with the
the power of the nation-state to
Netherlands, the technological
regulate its own market for loyalties.
capacity of the state to perform the
To put it in the words of the
function diminishes. An issue for the
American poet, Robert Frost, "good
Union will be whether it is a
fences make good neighbours." The
practicable unit for policing a market
task of the lTV could be redescribed
for loyal ties and enforcing rules for
as the design and registration of
entry and competition within it.
such fences and the enforcement of
Turkey provides another dramatic
anti-poaching principles.
history of the effort to maintain
To understand that historic function,
control over national identity.
difficult in itself, and not always
Article 133 of the Constitution gave
whOlly articulated, is indispensable
for coming to grips with the
Turkish Radio and Television
Authority (TRT), at least until midcomplexity of a transition to wholly
1993, a monopoly over broadcasting.
different expectations. National
TRT was not only monopolistic, "it
markets, constrained by borders,
was also essentially the voice of the
were long the key determiner of the
state, disseminating the unitary
market. For most of the century, the
ideology and culture of Turkish
international order assumed that
radio transmissions were primarily
republicanism and highly
susceptible to government
within the boundaries of one nation;
intervention." TRT remains charged,
the international function was to
by statute, with "promoting the
dispense frequencies so as to assure
values of country, unity, republic,
that these conditions of market
public order, harmony, and welfare,
division were met and enforced.
and to strengthen the principles of
International regulations and
Kemal Ataturk's reforms."7 In an
arrangements were built on the
environment in which there had
assumption of limiting broadcasting
been deep divisions about alternate
to "national service of good quality
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was turned into an essentially
nation-based enterprise for its first
half-century.
In the Western European states, this
phenomenon was captured by the
virtually universal practice of
limiting broadcasting competition
for national identities, until the mid1970s, primarily to entities
controlled by government or closely
related to it. If there was to be a
competition for loyalties, it would be
mediated through the government.
These were not oppressive states,
and they respected freedom of
information. But the monopoly over
the twentieth-centurys most
powerful medium was a reflection of
strong state participation in the
market for loyalties; it was difficult
to surrender and often important to
the internal mediating, suppression
or working out of differences.

The Dutch System
I will focus on the Dutch radio and
television system long famous for its
intricate recognition of specific
separated perceptions of Dutch
national identities. I do so precisely
to show how important national
control of the medium was to the
working out of a market for
loyalties. Consistent with a political
philosophy that assumes "pillarised"
segments of society-Catholic,
Protestant, liberal and socialist-the
Dutch,have established a television
system that, for a long time, gave
each segment its own
unencumbered opportunity to
broadcast, first on radio, then on
television. Competition was among
these groups for allocation of time
available, with awards dependent on
numbers of members they had.
Internal informal sanctions,
including taboos imposed by the
groups themselves,4 rendered these
pillarised broadcasting organisations
powerful reinforcers of separate
visions of Dutch identity, to limit, as
it were, interbrand competition,
What is interesting is not only the
rules that determined what groups
could participate, but the effort to
exclude competitors that would pose
a challenge to all of them. These
included "pirates," spill-over
signals, and, finally, directed
programming from abroad using

satellite and cable.
The existing favoured interest
groups, with govermnent as the
organising entity, used domestic
law, multilateral agreements, resort
to transnational regulatory bodieswhatever teclmique was possible, to
retain national control over the mix
and content of signals. The Dutch
situation remains complicated. In
terms of the economic model,
however, the history of broadcasting
in the Netherlands is illuminating
for many reasons. Here was a place
where the system was originally and
explicitly designed to identify
alternative proponents of a national
identity and careful to allocate
markets among them, These
competitors, as might well be
expected, sought to exclude others
who might reduce their market
share. Competition from abroad5
altered the capacity of the state to
preserve the strength of the existing
competitors or stabilise the ability of
those who continued to seek to
market loyalties to use the media to
reinforce particular identities. 6
One can say that the European
Union serves as the next higher
institution for the organisation of the
media at a time when, as with the
Netherlands, the technological
capacity of the state to perform the
function diminishes. An issue for the
Union will be whether it is a
practicable unit for policing a market
for loyal ties and enforcing rules for
entry and competition within it.
Turkey provides another dramatic
history of the effort to maintain
control over national identity.
Article 133 of the Constitution gave
Turkish Radio and Television
AuthOrity (TRT), at least until mid1993, a monopoly over broadcasting.
TRT was not only monopolistic, "it
was also essentially the voice of the
state, disseminating the unitary
ideology and culture of Turkish
republicanism and highly
susceptible to govermnent
intervention." TRT remains charged,
by statute, with "promoting the
values of country, unity, republic,
public order, harmony, and welfare,
and to strengthen the principles of
Kemal Ataturk's reforms,"7 In an
environment in which there had
been deep divisions about alternate

national identities, TRT, as the
proponent of the modern secular
state, was seen as an instrument for
cohesiveness. When the number of
channels available was expanded in
the 1980s to bring programme
availability closer to world
standards, the new channels, at the
time, were all made part of TRT.
When TRT was attacked for leaning
to the left and broadcasting
programs that legitimated Islamic
fundamentalism-a doctrine
considered hostile to the secular
state-the agency's director general
was forced to resign. 8
Examples in which law is used to
protect particular national identities
can be reproduced in Belgium,
Germany, in China, almost
everywhere: in each case
demonstrating how national
legislation is used in widespread
fashion to allocate internal markets
and to establish, where possible,
cartels of allegiances.

C. New technology, globalism
and the market for loyalties
The primary function of
international legal organisations,
until recently, has been to preserve
the power of the nation-state to
regulate its own market for loyalties.
To put it in the words of the
American poet, Robert Frost, good
fences make good neighbours." The
task of the lTV could be redescribed
as the design and registration of
such fences and the enforcement of
anti-poaching principles.
To understand that historic function,
difficult in itself, and not always
wholly articulated, is indispensable
for coming to grips with the
complexity of a transition to wholly
different expectations. National
markets, constrained by borders,
were long the key determiner of the
market. For most of the century, the
international order assumed that
radio transmissions were primarily
within the boundaries of one nation;
the international function was to
dispense frequencies so as to assure
that these conditions of market
division were met and enforced.
International regulations and
arrangements were built on the
assumption of limiting broadcasting
to "national service of good quality
II
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within the frontiers of the country
concerned." In the interludes
between the Great Wars, there were,
for example, bilateral and
multilateral agreements to control
propaganda subversive to the state
system. For example, the League of
Nations' sponsored Convention
Concerning the Use of Broadcasting
in the Cause of Peace provided that
the high contracting parties
mutually undertake to prohibit, and
if occasion arises, to stop without
delay the broadcasting within their
respective territories of any
transmission which to the
determinant of good international
understanding is of such a character
as to incite the population of any
territory to acts incompatible with
the internal order of the security of a
territory of a high contracting party.9
Now, some propose functions of the
global body that would be vastly
different. A GCC would retain the
traditions and needs of the past, the
close ties to the nation-state. But, as
the experience of the lTU has shown,
there is a sharply conflicting role:
assisting in the world-wide spread
of technology, which implies
invading the meaning and
effectiveness of borders it has almost
always been committed to preserve.
The old paradigm is preserving the
power of the nation:state (or the
region) to control its internal debate
(subject, in some way, to human
rights principles). The new
paradigm foresees a promotional
role, one in which, at the end, a
global system might exist in which
the power of the state to perform its
traditional market-regulating role
would be substantially in question.
The current reforms of the lTV are
an example of evolution toward a
system reflecting, and attempting to
harmonise, these disparate
tendencies. In the new system, for
the convenience of all, standards can
evolve and rules of the game will be
discussed to determine whether to
modify, slightly, the practices of
satellite-based programmers and
voice channels to cross borders. The
reforms clarify and streamline the
powers of the lTV so that it can
respond, more quickly, to the needs
of its very broad range of
constituents.
18
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But to understand its dilemma, and
that of other proposed global
regulators, it is useful to return to
the concept of the market for
loyalties and how it will be
established, regulated and policed in
the future. This is an important
question, both for nation-states and
for the global entity, because the
capacity of states, as I have pointed
out, to use traditional forms of
media law to establish barriers to
entry and to parcel the market
among various interests (induding
that of the government itself) is
deteriorating. The media statutes
that divide allegiances and control
narratives already have the aura of
being of another era, an era in which
the bounds of competition for
national identity could be contained.
While the passion for using law to
regulate loyalties and fence out
competition proceeds unabated,
these efforts seem doomed.
Increasingly, there is a new market
for loyalties, a global one. The
competitors (producers in the terms
I put earlier), are not only
governments but great transnational
corporations, religious entities and
programmers of signals that bind
together dispersed ethnic
populations. The world is moving
from a highly regulated, carefully
divided series of relatively closed
markets for loyalties to a situation in
which local identities are subject to a
new set of competitors, relatively
unconstrained by national
governments. 10
Modern broadcasting devices, used
as the perfect instruments for
maintaining the state, are, also,
consummate devices for
undermining the established order.
The nation state was, as Eli Noam
has written, "at tension with crossborder allegiances-whether
proletarian international solidarity,
rebellious youth culture,
international financial capital, or
ethnic minorities." Now, however,
new networks (for him the electronic
capabilities as well as the satellite)
weaken national cohesion,
strengthening particularism and
internationalising it. "lt is difficult
for a state to extend its powers
beyond traditional frontiers, but it is
easy for the new networks to do so."

Audio cassettes, circulated from
France to Iran, rendered immediate
the fiery zeal of the Ayatollah,
helping to unite opposition to the
Shah. Radio, in the last days of the
Soviet era, gave to the people of
Moscow the sense that they were a
community, independent, at least,
and stronger, at most, than the
organisers of the reactionary coup.
The lesson is not necessarily or only
the lesson of freedom: it is also the
lesson of imperilled narratives and
susceptible regimes.

The contest of imagery
If one way of understanding the

political essence of society is to
examine and calibrate its internal
web of message-sending, 11 then new
technologies mean that the society of
reference requires reinterpretation as
the codes of interconnection are
modified. The satellite, the most
modern form of communication,
echoes ancient forms of social, "the
older imagining, where states were
defined by centres, borders were
porous and indistinct, and
sovereignties faded imperceptibly
into one another." Then, the
technology and organisation of
imaginings contributed,
"paradoxically enough, [to1the ease
with which pre-modern empires and
kingdoms were able to sustain their
rule over immensely heterogeneous,
and often not even contiguous,
populations for long periods of
time." Now, kingdoms outside the
established order have a similar
capability to surmount selfcontained national identities.
Who are the candidates for these
new kingdoms? They can include
dynamic and charismatic religious
forces, Islamic or Christian. The
possibilities also include a
rejuvenated Voice of America, aBBe
World Service, given a new charter
by Parliament, or other modernised
extensions of a national and
propagandistic past. But mostly,
these new producers, reaching past
boundaries, include the kind of
ideology that springs from MTV or
the recognisable Western package,
the appeal to the individual that is
the underlying drumbeat of
advertising-supported programs.
Sometimes these potentates have

----------------

names, in the fashion of the
monarchs of old, like Murdoch or
Disney. Already, a global
competition exists among the BBC,
CNN, NBC Superchannel and
Murdoch to establish hegemony
over global news, if not imagery.
These are not all kingdoms that have
the emotional power to sustain the
imagination of far-flung peoples,
replacing the current order. There is
no national identity of Murdoch, no
flag or loyalty to Disney. But
between, in general, religious faith
and consumerism, there seems to be
passionate battle enough. The
contest of imagery is more likely to
be found in the next generation of
global tensions, not among nation
states, but rather between clashing
civilisations, defined by history,
language, etlmicity and religion. 12
Seizure of the instruments of
imagery, as much as weapons of
destruction, will be a threat of the
twenty-first century.
The nature of the global drama, the
role of the programs and narratives
poured through the skies as a
technique of the new era may have
been best captured-or inferred
from its opposite-by the gifted
Polish journalist and author Ryszard
Kapuscinski. He was writing about
Iran and the turn to Khomeini after
the westernising experience with the
Shah, but the words have a more
general truth:
A nation trampled by despotism,
degraded, forced into the role of an
object, seeks shelter, seeks a place where
it can dig itself in, wall itself off, be
itself. This is indispensable if it is to
preserve its individuality, its identity,
even 'its ordinariness. But a whole
nation cannot emigrate, so it undertakes
a migration in time rather than in
space.
Kapucsinski was writing, here, of
resistance to existing messages from
the West, a "walling in" that must
use every technique possible to
screen the compelling, attractive,
permeating voices from without.
This theory of atavism, this turn
against modernity, also suggests one
of the strong motivations, conscious
or not, on behalf of the West, for
projecting the enveloping narratives
of its contemporary radio and
television. There is a key here to the

importance of the stories that are
pumped into the transition societies
and the periphery of the developed
world, a key to the impact of the
dramas that emanate from the
dream faclories of Hollywood to be
delivered to the villages of the
Carpathians, pub-keepers in Wales,
shepherds in the Basque Country, or
workers in Azerbazjian. The rhythm
and music of Western radio and
television become, themselves, a
push toward modernity against
competing forces. Alan Rusbridger
of the Guardian caught this "full
surreality of the New Media World
Order," in a village, an hour from
New Delhi, where, adjacent to a the
temple of the monkey-god,
Hanuman, "young people chant, the
family of Yogbal Sharma zaps from
MTV with its legs, lipstick, kisses,
jeans, fast cars, beaches, cafes, drink,
and waterfalls," a representative
sample of Star TV fare. In the years
to come, Rusbridger observes,
children will have to choose whether
to spend Tuesday evening singing
songs to Hanuman or watching
Dynasty."
Whether the competitors will be the
powerful but amorphous industries
of faith, or the distributors of blue
jeans and alcohol, or empires yet
unborn, the point remains the same:
either way, the now-reigning
oligopolies will be weakened,
replaced by new allegiances,
reinforced by a new media structure.
That will be the case because the old
market for loyalties survives no
more. A new market will emerge,
and it is there that the place for
global co-ordination, allocation and
regulation will find its home.

D. The Market for Loyalties and

aGee

The fierceness of competition-both
for economic markets and for
markets for identity-underscores
the barriers to establishing a unified,
powerful and comprehensive Global
Communications Commission. The
situation is increasingly dynamic
and the competitors not fully
identified. The existing building
blocks of international bodies, the
nation-states, have competing ideas,
themselves, of the shape of the
future. Pioneer ways of dealing with

the new technology suggest the kind
of steps likely to persist in this
transformative period. Regional
multilateral arrangements, especially
the Television Without Frontiers
Directive, are harbingers. The 1989
Broadcast Directive can be read as
an evolution from long-standing
national forms of exclusion
(maintaining monopolies for
national broadcasters from foreign
competitors), to a common union
which encourages trade in ideas
within the community but seeks to
control competition from without.
New technology serves as a prod for
broader, supranational forms of
regulation, for loci that provide
more effective market division and
policing given the geographical
sweep of new media. Under the
Directive, member states are
responsible to consult with receiving
counterparts if programming has
destabilising consequences. The
European Union is also a forum for
eliminating natipnal measures in
which the government maintains
close to a monopoly for itself.
Those countries that oppose the
content of messages coming from
outside, for religious or political
reasons seem to have, at present,
little direct impacl on the behaviour
of the suppliers of programming.
There are temporary exceptions,
recently illustrated by the
discussions between Rupert
Murdoch and China over the
carriage of the BBC. States have
tried to turn to controlling demand
for unfavoured programming,
increasing, as it were, the price of
viewing. In some settings, a partial
or wholesale withdrawal from the
mainstream of world
communications commerce will be
attempted so as to prolong the hold
of existing national identities.
Such a withdrawal can be policed at
high cost and is increasingly
ineffective. In Singapore, a ban on
the purchase or use of satellite
receiving dishes, absent a hard-toobtain license, is designed to keep
out those programs that are
unapproved. Much more vigorous
efforts to fence out foreign signals
characterise China and Iran where
watching foreign programming may
be a crime. 14 These steps are
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extensions of the most obvious and
easiest means of creating regulable
barriers to entry during the early
television era: to limit the number of
channels of television available for
public viewing and retain control of
the scarce resource and that remains
the case. 15 Prohibition of satellite
receiving dishes, moratoria on the
award of broadcast frequencies and
the maintenance of an uncertain
legal regime rendering investment in
cable unlikely are all examples of
this strategy. In communities where
feelings are intense, informal
mechanisms, including the reporting
of cultural disobedience and even
terror might be reactions to the
inevitability of norm-dissolving
technologies.
Other instruments for affecting the
shape of the market for loyalties are
emerging. Antitrust policy is a
possible means of affecting
tendencies toward evolving
monopolies or oligopolies in the
software industry, or in the film
industry, or among the new
vertically-integrated giants,
tendencies that may have a
substantial impact on the competing
narratives. This is not because
Japanese-owned Hollywood firms
will be more inclined to favour the
country of their corporate owners.
Rather it is because monopolies
anywhere in the chain of control can
and will be reflected in who has
access to the technology and for
what programming purpose. In
some places, moral rights laws, and
other aspects of copyright are
hurdles to transnational distribution
of programming. The United States
has insisted on improved intellectual
property regimes, more protective of
American authors, in the former
Soviet Union, the China and
elsewhere, presumably so that, in
the long run, a more developed
market can succeed.
Many of these steps mark the further
definition of telecommunications
(and all information services) as
commodities of trade, not the magic
force for social cohesion. The very
definition of information as a
commodity and not as an engine of
national identity, however,
implicates the market for loyalties.
The emphasis on media as trade
20
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tends to move jurisdiction from a
Global Communications
Commission toward a World Trade
Organisation in which the principles
governing entry and competition are
bound to have a trade-related
rationale. Privatisation, too, can be
seen to shift jurisdiction away from
the specialised telecommunications
regulators and toward general trade
institutions.
As a provisional resistance to this
tendency, the European Union, in
the GATT negotiations, successfully
insisted on the power to
discriminate in favour of locally
produced film and television
programs as an exception to
principles of free trade. The Union
has developed a complex system of
subsidies and other encouragements
to create a European cultural space
and to enhance the capacity of
Europe to compete abroad in the
area of programming. But here it
was acting under the older vision,
while simultaneously moving
toward the new.
When all is said and done, the
capacity of existing states to regulate
the narrative of political discourse
will be reduced by the new
technologies and the mechanisms
that are evolving for their
exploitation. Even in an era of more
limited broadcast entry, some
argued that Radio Free Europe,
Radio Liberty, and the Voice of
America helped destabilise the
Soviet regime. If abundant channels
become easily accessible, universally
available, and used by powerfully
charismatic umnediated voices, the
potential for novel, widespread,
populist alliances, spreading across
wide areas, will certainly be realised.
There will be less control over which
entities are unhorsed.
There is no close fit, as yet, between
a global market for loyalties and a
global regulating entity, but patterns
may emerge. We are still at an early,
frontier-like stage in the overarching
competition among global voices
and, as a consequence, no consensus'
can yet be available on the universal
questions of standards, enforcement
and the role of the state ..
Cautiously, mechanisms begin to
find their way, mediating transborder markets for loyalties, playing

necessary roles as local states require
third-party interventions so that
large-scale technological advances
can take place. But sovereignty is a
difficult thing to cede. The
candidates for power~the ITU, the
proposed World Trade
Organisation, the Union on the
regionallevel~all face the reality of
sponsors reluctant to delegate or
recognise that the transfer of control
has the feel of inevitability. At some
point, in the not too distant future, a
global market for loyalties will
require a global hand, invisible or
not. But that moment is not with us
yet.
II
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